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Abstract
Oblivious transfer protocol is a basic building block in cryptography
and is used to transfer information from a sender to a receiver in such
a way that, at the end of the protocol, the sender does not know if the
receiver got the message or not.
Since Shor’s quantum algorithm appeared, the security of most of clas-
sical cryptographic schemes has been compromised, as they rely on the
fact that factoring is unfeasible. To overcome this, quantum mechanics
has been used intensively in the past decades, and alternatives resistant
to quantum attacks have been developed in order to fulfill the (potential)
lack of security of a significant number of classical schemes.
In this paper, we present a quantum computationally secure protocol
for oblivious transfer between two parties, under the assumption of quan-
tum hardness of state distinguishability. The protocol is feasible, in the
sense that it is implementable in polynomial time.
Keywords: Quantum information, Communication security, Oblivious trans-
fer
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Ac, 03.67.Dd
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1 Introduction
An oblivious transfer protocol involves two parties, a sender (Alice) and a re-
ceiver (Bob). It consists of two phases: the transferring phase and the opening
phase. The goal of the sender is to send a message during the transferring phase,
that will not be known to the receiver until the opening phase, during which
the sender reveals the message with probability 1/2. The goal of the receiver
is that, upon opening the message, the sender is oblivious to the fact that the
message was successfully transferred or not. Although not explicitly stated in
the original argument, it is usually assumed that the receiver knows, at the end
of the protocol, if he got the correct message (see for example [Cré87]).
The first oblivious transfer scheme was proposed by Rabin [Rab81] and is
based on the same assumptions as the RSA cryptographic system. In Rabin’s
scheme, the sender sends a message to the receiver that is able to decrypt it
properly with probability 1/2. At the end of the protocol, the sender remains
oblivious to whether or not the receiver got the correct message. Crépeau later
showed that Rabin’s oblivious transfer is equivalent to 1-out-of-2 oblivious trans-
fer [Cré87]. In 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer the sender has two messages to send
such that: the receiver gets only one of the two with equal probability; the
sender is oblivious to which message was received. Although not considered by
then in the cryptographic domain, Wiesner had already proposed (in the 70’s
but only published in the 80’s) in his pioneer work on quantum cryptography a
scheme based on multiplexing which is equivalent to 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer
protocol [Wie83]. Even, Goldreich, and Lempel [EGL85] generalized the original
idea of 1-out-of-2 protocol proposing the notion of 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer
protocol. In this case, the receiver gets 1-out-of-n possible different messages.
Oblivious transfer is a particularly important primitive as from an oblivious
transfer protocol one can apply the technique presented in [Cré87] to construct
a 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol which in turn, using the technique pre-
sented in [BBCS92], can be transformed into a bit-commitment scheme from
O(n) oblivious transfer instances. Furthermore, practical protocols of oblivious
transfer are useful in designing secure multiparty computation schemes, as sug-
gested in recent papers [LP12, LZ13], and are building blocks for more complex
cryptographic protocols [BCR86, Kil88, HL93, May95, CDM00].
In the last decades quantum computation has played a crucial role in the
development of cryptographic analysis. The breakthrough of quantum compu-
tation in the realm of cryptography is due to Shor’s factoring algorithm [Sho97].
This algorithm compromises the security of most common public key crypto-
graphic schemes as factoring becomes feasible with a quantum computer. Since
today’s technology is evolving to be able to deal with a larger number of qubits,
a possibility of having affordable and reliable quantum computers in the fu-
ture arises, compromising the secrecy of communications and transactions. To
overcome this possibility, researchers have focused on the development of pro-
tocols that are resilient to quantum adversaries. This effort started with key
distribution protocol proposed in [BB84] that was shown to be secure by Shor
and Preskill [SP00]. This result boosted the development of other types of
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quantum cryptographic protocols (see for instance [CCKL08, MW10]). One
such example is the quantum version oblivious transfer proposed by Bennet,
Brassard, Crépeau and Skubiszewska [BBCS92]. However, as perfectly secure
(quantum) bit commitment and (quantum) oblivious transfer are known to be
impossible [May97, LC96], all the schemes proposed for these primitives will
necessarily assume a tradeoff between cheating strategies or will require some
computational security assumptions.
In this paper we present a polynomial time quantum oblivious transfer pro-
tocol based on a presumed polynomial hard problem even for a quantum com-
puter,1 the Quantum State Computational Distinguishability with Fully Flipped
Permutations, denoted by QSCDff , presented in [KKNY05]. It is the stan-
dard problem of quantum state distinguishability, applied to two particular
quantum states: ⊗k(n)i=1 1√2 (|σi〉 + |σi ◦ π〉) and ⊗
k(n)
i=1
1√
2
(|σi〉 − |σi ◦ π〉), where
σi ∈ Sn, π ∈ Kn are permutations (Kn is the set of all permutation in Sn of
order 2, such that π(i) 6= i for all i), and k is some polynomial, such that for
each state the array of σis is chosen at random. In the same paper, the authors
discuss how one can explore the indistinguishability of these quantum states
in the scope of cryptography and propose a cryptographic public key scheme
that, under the hardness assumption of QSCDff , is secure against polynomial
quantum adversaries using π as a trapdoor.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present
the basic notions, problems, notation and results used in the rest of the paper.
We also show the equivalence between a previously known algorithm, used in
[KKNY05], and a particular orthogonal measurement that is used to prove the
security of our protocol, under the assumption that QSCDff is polynomially
hard for quantum computers. In Section 3 we present our protocol for oblivious
transfer and prove its correctness and security. In Section 4 we present the
conclusions.
2 Preliminaries
We use a binary alphabet Σ = {0, 1} and strings of length ℓ, which are elements
of Σℓ. The group SSn is the set of all permutations over the set {1, . . . , n}, whose
elements we denote by Greek letters σ, τ, δ, . . ., together with the composition
operation ◦.1 In the rest of the paper we assume n to be of the form 2(2m+1),
for some m ∈ N.
Example 2.1 Consider n = 6 and σ ∈ S6 defined as σ(1) = 2, σ(2) = 3, σ(3) =
1, σ(4) = 5, σ(5) = 4 and σ(6) = 6. We represent this permutation as σ =
(1 2 3)(4 5), where (1 2 3) and (4 5) represent the orbits of elements of {1, . . . 6}.
The orbit of i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with respect to σ is (i σ(i) . . . σj(i)), where the
superscript is the number of times σ is applied to element i, and j is the smallest
integer such that σ(σj(i)) = i.
1A problem is polynomially hard if there is no polynomial time algorithm for solving it.
1Formally, each permutation σ ∈ Sn is a bijective function over {1, . . . , n}.
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Notice that this representation is not unique, and we can represent this same
σ as (4 5)(1 2 3) or (5 4)(2 3 1).
Given a permutation σ ∈ Sn, other than the identity, one can decompose
it into a sequence of transpositions, i.e., elementary permutations that only
exchange two elements. It is easy to see that such decomposition is not unique,
but the number of transpositions, denoted by #(σ), has always the same parity
Âăand hence one can define the sign of a permutation σ as sgn(σ) = (−1)#(σ).
Example 2.2 Consider σ as defined in Example 2.1. Three possible decompo-
sitions of σ in terms of transpositions (derived from the three given represen-
tations) are (1 3)(1 2)(4 5) and (4 5)(1 3)(1 2) and (5 4)(2 1)(2 3), and all of
them have parity 1.
One can, in fact, show that if a permutation σ generates L orbits of elements
from {1, . . . , n} of lengths ℓ1, . . . , ℓL then #(σ) =
∑L
i=1(ℓi − 1). In our case,
the representation of σ in Example 2.1 has orbits of length 3 and 2, hence
#(σ) = (3− 1)+ (2− 1) = 3. The same σ was represented in this example with
3 orbits of length 2, hence #(σ) = 3× (2− 1) = 3.
Since |Sn| = n! one needs log(n!) =
∑n
i=1 log i ≤ n logn ∈ O(n log n) bits
to represent each σ ∈ Sn. Note that Sn consists of two sets of equal size:
En containing the even permutations (i.e., permutations with sign 1), and its
complement n consisting of all odd permutations. Hence Sn = En ∪ n.
As in [KKNY05], we consider the following subset of Sn:
Kn =
{
π ∈ Sn : π ◦ π = idn and π(i) 6= i, for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n}
}
.
Example 2.3 One can see that the permutation σ of Example 2.1 is not in K6
as σ ◦ σ 6= idn, e.g., σ ◦ σ(1) = σ(2) = 3 6= 1. We also do not have σ(i) 6= i for
i = 6.
As an example of a permutation in K6 we have π = (1 2)(3 6)(4 6).
One can immediately see that for an even n, any permutation π ∈ Kn can
always be decomposed into n/2 transpositions since each element i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
has to appear in (at least) one transposition (otherwise π(i) = i), and appears
only once, as π2 = idn. Given that we assumed n = 2(2m + 1), we have that
π ∈ Kn if and only if it can be written as an odd number of transpositions and
hence π ∈ n.
A counting argument revels that the size of Kn is:
|Kn| =
(
n
n/2
)(n
2
)
! =
n!(n
2
)
!
.
Let n ∈ N and π ∈ Kn, and consider the Hilbert space
Hn = span{|σ〉 : σ ∈ Sn},
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such that for all σ and σ′, 〈σ|σ′〉 = δσ,σ′ . Let |ψ±π (σ)〉 = 1√2 (|σ〉 ± |σ ◦ π〉).
Notice that for every π the set {|ψ±π (σ)〉 : σ ∈ En} is an orthonormal basis.
Indeed, we have that
〈
ψ±π (σ)|ψ±π (σ′)
〉
=
1
2
(〈σ|σ′〉 ± 〈σ|σ′ ◦ π〉 ± 〈σ ◦ π|σ′〉+ 〈σ ◦ π|σ′ ◦ π〉)
is either 1, when σ = σ′, or 0 otherwise. This is because σ, σ′ ∈ En and π ∈ n,
and consequently 〈σ|σ′ ◦ π〉 = 〈σ ◦ π|σ′〉 = 0.
On the other hand
〈
ψ±π (σ)|ψ∓π (σ′)
〉
=
1
2
(〈σ|σ′〉 ∓ 〈σ|σ′ ◦ π〉 ± 〈σ ◦ π|σ′〉 − 〈σ ◦ π|σ′ ◦ π〉)
is always 0: when σ = σ′, the first and last terms cancel each other, while
the other two terms are always zero. Since |ψ±π (σ)〉 = ±|ψ±π (σ ◦ π)〉, the set
{|ψ±π (σ)〉 : σ ∈ n} is also an orthonormal basis.
Consider the following quantum states defined in [KKNY05]:
ρ+π =
1
2n!
∑
σ∈Sn
(|σ〉+ |σ ◦ π〉)(〈σ|+ 〈σ ◦ π|)
=
1
n!
∑
σ∈Sn
∣∣ψ+π (σ)〉〈ψ+π (σ)∣∣
=
2
n!
∑
σ∈En
∣∣ψ+π (σ)〉〈ψ+π (σ)∣∣
and
ρ−π =
1
2n!
∑
σ∈Sn
(|σ〉 − |σ ◦ π〉)(〈σ| − 〈σ ◦ π|)
=
1
n!
∑
σ∈Sn
∣∣ψ−π (σ)〉〈ψ−π (σ)∣∣
=
2
n!
∑
σ∈En
∣∣ψ−π (σ)〉〈ψ−π (σ)∣∣.
We are interested in these particular states as they are orthogonal to each
other and hence fully distinguishable, provided one knows which π was used
to prepare them. Without the knowledge of π the problem of distinguishing
these states is believed to be polynomially hard even for quantum computers,
as stated in [KKNY05]. First, we state the problem:
Problem 2.4 (QSCDff) The Quantum State Computational Distinction with
Fully Flipped Permutations Problem, denoted by QSCDff , is defined as:
Instances: Two quantum states (ρ+π )
⊗k(n) and (ρ−π )
⊗k(n) where n = 2(2m+
1) for some m ∈ N, and k is some fixed polynomial, i.e., each state con-
sists of k(n) copies of ρ+π and ρ
−
π , respectively.
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Question: Are (ρ+π )
⊗k(n) and (ρ−π )
⊗k(n) computationally indistinguishable,
i.e., is the probability of a quantum polynomial time algorithm to be able to
distinguish between the states (ρ+π )
⊗k(n) and (ρ−π )
⊗k(n) a negligible func-
tion?
The problem QSCDff is closely related to the hidden subgroup problem
over symmetric groups for which no one knows an efficient quantum algorithm
to solve it. In [KKNY05] the authors reduced the QSCDff problem to a vari-
ant of the unique graph automorphism problem, that is also presumably hard
for quantum computers with polynomial time resources, proving the following
hardness result:
Theorem 2.5 ([KKNY05]) If there exists a polynomial-time quantum algo-
rithm that solves QSCDff with non-negligible advantage, then there exists a
polynomial-time quantum algorithm that solves the graph automorphism prob-
lem in the worst case for infinitely-many input lengths.
The interesting property that makes this problem suitable for cryptography
is that it has a trapdoor that allows one to efficiently distinguish the states:
one can distinguish, with certainty, (ρ+π )
⊗k(n) from (ρ−π )
⊗k(n), provided that an
extra piece of information is given, in this case π. Furthermore, when using a
permutation π′ different from the trapdoor π, the probability of distinguishing
these states is the same as plain guessing. In order to present the protocol and
analyze its complexity and security, we need the following obvious proposition:
Proposition 2.6 The following linear operators are unitary:
• Cπ((|0〉+ |1〉)|σ〉) = |0〉|σ〉 + |1〉|σ ◦ π〉;
• C1(|0〉|σ〉+ |1〉|π〉) = |0〉(|σ〉+ |π〉);
• Cr◦(|φ〉|ψ〉) = |φ〉|φ ◦ ψ〉 and Cl◦(|φ〉|ψ〉) = |φ〉|ψ ◦ φ〉;
• Cswap(|φ〉|ψ〉) = |ψ〉|φ〉;
• Csgn(|α〉) = (−1)sgn(α)|α〉.
The quantum algorithm presented in [KKNY05], Algorithm 2.7, justifies
that given the private key π one can produce the states (ρ+π )
⊗k(n) in polynomial
time using only Hadamard H and the operations defined in Proposition 2.6.
Algorithm 2.7 (to generate (ρ+π )
⊗k(n) [KKNY05]) For the sake of simplic-
ity of the presentation we consider a fixed n and the case where k(n) = 1. The
reader can easily generalize the argument for k(n) systems.
Input: π ∈ Kn.
Output: ρ+π =
2
n!
∑
σ∈En
(|σ〉+ |σ ◦ π〉)(〈σ|+ 〈σ ◦ π|).
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Step 1. Select a random σ ∈ Sn and prepare the initial state |0〉⊗
|idn〉 ⊗ |σ〉 ∈ C2 ⊗Cn logn ⊗Cn logn.
Step 2. Apply H ⊗ 1⊗ 1.
Step 3. Apply Cπ ⊗ 1.
Step 4. Apply C1 ⊗ 1.
Step 5. Apply 1⊗ Cswap.
Step 6. Apply 1⊗ Cr◦ .
The third register is now in the state |ψ+π (σ)〉 = 1√2 (|σ〉 + |σ ◦ π〉). Since σ is
chosen at random, the ensemble of such systems is represented by the mixed
state ρ+π .
Note that it is possible to prepare the state ρ+π as a partial trace of an en-
tangled state. In order to do that, one should start from |0〉|idn〉 1√n!
∑
σ∈Sn |σ〉.
Upon applying Steps 1 to 6 of the previous algorithm the overall state is
|0〉 1√
n!
∑
σ∈Sn |σ〉 1√2 (|σ〉 + |σ ◦ π〉) and the third register is again in the state
ρ+π .
In the next lemma we show that one can easily transform ρ+π into ρ
−
π , and
vice versa, without knowing π. This property follows immediately from the fact
that π is an odd permutation.
Lemma 2.8 ([KKNY05]) There exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm
that, with probability 1, transforms ρ+π into ρ
−
π and keeps 1 =
1
n!
∑
σ∈Sn |σ〉〈σ|
invariant, for any n = 2(2m+ 1), with m ∈ N, and any permutation π ∈ Kn.
Proof: Let π ∈ Kn be a permutation and consider a pure quantum state
|ψ+π (σ)〉. The desired algorithm implements the transformation:
|ψ+π (σ)〉 =
|σ〉 + |σ ◦ π〉√
2
Csgn−→ (−1)
sgn(σ)|σ〉+ (−1)sgn(σ)+1|σ ◦ π〉√
2
= (−1)sgn(σ)|ψ−π (σ)〉.
Notice that determining the sign of a permutation is a computation that can
be done in polynomial time. Furthermore, it is easy to see that this algorithm
leaves 1 invariant. 
The following algorithm explores the trapdoor property ofQSCDff : given π,
one can distinguish in polynomial time and with probability 1 the quantum states
(ρ+π )
⊗k(n) and (ρ−π )
⊗k(n).
Algorithm 2.9 (to distinguish (ρ+π )
⊗k(n) from (ρ−π )
⊗k(n) [KKNY05]) For
the sake of simplicity of the presentation we consider a fixed n and the case where
k(n) = 1. The reader can easily generalize the argument for k(n) systems.
Input: π ∈ Kn and a quantum state χπ that is either ρ+π or ρ−π .
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Output: 0 if χπ = ρ
+
π , and 1 if χπ = ρ
−
π .
Step 1. Prepare the system in the state |0〉〈0| ⊗ χπ, where |0〉 ∈
C
2.
Step 2. Apply H ⊗ 1.
Step 3. Apply Cπ.
Step 4. Apply again H ⊗ 1.
Step 5. Measure M+ = (0 · |0〉〈0|+ 1 · |1〉〈1|) ⊗ 1 and output the
result.
Proof: After performing the second step the obtained state is 12 |+〉〈+| ⊗ χπ,
with |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉). Since Cπ(|+〉(|σ〉 ± |σ ◦ π〉)) = |±〉(|σ〉 ± |σ ◦ π〉), the
overall state after the third step is |±〉〈±| ⊗ ρ±π . So, by applying Hadamard on
the first register and measuring it in the computational basis we get the desired
outcome. 
We have shown that the above algorithm is able to distinguish with certainty
between χπ = (ρ+π )
⊗k(n) and χπ = (ρ−π )
⊗k(n), using only polynomial quantum
resources, provided that we use the correct π. We will show later that if χπ′ is
created with a different permutation π′ 6= π, then the answer will be a random
variable with distribution close to uniform (see Theorem 3.2 for details).
Algorithm 2.9 provides a computational approach to the problem of dis-
tinguishing the two states and is suitable for defining the public key scheme
presented in [KKNY05]. In our work, due to the nature of the problem at hand,
we will instead consider measurements. We will show next that the result of
Algorithm 2.9 is equivalent to measuring the orthogonal observable
Mπ = 0 · P+π + 1 · P−π
where
P±π =
∑
σ∈En
∣∣ψ±π (σ)〉〈ψ±π (σ)∣∣ = 12
∑
σ∈En
(|σ〉 ± |σ ◦ π〉)(〈σ| ± 〈σ ◦ π|).
Proposition 2.10 Applying Algorithm 2.9 with π and measuring Mπ = 0 ·
P+π +1 ·P−π are equivalent processes: the probability distribution of the outcomes
of the Algorithm 2.9 is the same as the probability distribution of the outcomes
of the measurement Mπ, and the resulting states are the same.
As in Algorithm 2.9, we consider a fixed n and the case where k(n) = 1.
The reader can easily generalize the argument for k(n) systems using M⊗k(n)π
instead of Mπ.
Proof: In order to prove this proposition, first notice that by the linearity of
the measurement, it is enough to show the result only for the case of a general
pure |ψ〉. Since for every π the set {|ψ±π (σ)〉 : σ ∈ En} is a basis, we can write
|ψ〉 =
∑
σ∈En
(
c+σ
∣∣ψ+π (σ)〉+ c−σ ∣∣ψ−π (σ)〉) .
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We first compute the following:
P±π |ψ〉 =
∑
σ∈En
∣∣ψ±π (σ)〉〈ψ±π (σ)∣∣
( ∑
σ′∈En
(
c+σ′
∣∣ψ+π (σ′)〉+ c−σ′ ∣∣ψ−π (σ′)〉)
)
=
∑
σ∈En
∑
σ′∈En
∣∣ψ±π (σ)〉 (c+σ′ 〈ψ±π (σ)|ψ+π (σ′)〉+ c−σ′ 〈ψ±π (σ)|ψ−π (σ′)〉)
=
∑
σ∈En
c±σ
∣∣ψ±π (σ)〉.
The result of the first 4 Steps of the Algorithm 2.9 is (|ψ±π (σ)〉 = ±|ψ±π (σπ)〉):
(H ⊗ 1)Cπ(H ⊗ 1)|0〉|ψ〉
=
1√
2
(H ⊗ 1)Cπ(|0〉+ |1〉)|ψ〉
=
1√
2
(H ⊗ 1)Cπ
(
|0〉|ψ〉+ |1〉
∑
σ∈En
(
c+σ
∣∣ψ+π (σ)〉+ c−σ ∣∣ψ−π (σ)〉)
)
=
1√
2
(H ⊗ 1)
(
|0〉|ψ〉+ |1〉
∑
σ∈En
(
c+σ
∣∣ψ+π (σ)〉− c−σ ∣∣ψ−π (σ)〉)
)
=
|0〉+ |1〉
2
∑
σ∈En
(
c+σ
∣∣ψ+π (σ)〉+ c−σ ∣∣ψ−π (σ)〉)
+
|0〉 − |1〉
2
∑
σ∈En
(
c+σ
∣∣ψ+π (σ)〉− c−σ ∣∣ψ−π (σ)〉)
= |0〉
∑
σ∈En
c+σ
∣∣ψ+π (σ)〉+ |1〉 ∑
σ∈En
c−σ
∣∣ψ−π (σ)〉
= |0〉P+π |ψ〉+ |1〉P−π |ψ〉.
Measuring the first register in the computational basis (Step 5 of Algorithm 2.9)
collapses the second register (up to a normalization factor) in the state P±π |ψ〉
with probability ||P±π |ψ〉||2, just as if Mπ was measured. 
An immediate corollary is that Mπ distinguishes ρ+π and ρ
−
π with probability
one.
At the end of an oblivious transfer protocol, Bob must know if he received
the message or not. In our protocol, this step is guaranteed by a universal hash
function. These functions map larger strings to strings of smaller size, hence
collisions are unavoidable, i.e., different messages can be mapped to the same
hash. Despite this fact, one can design these functions in such a way that:
• they are computationally efficient, i.e., one can compute its value from a
message in polynomial time;
• hashes are almost equally distributed.
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Definition 2.11 Let A and B be two sets of size a and b, respectively, such
that a > b, and let H be a collection of hash functions h : A→ B. H is said to
be a universal family of hash functions if
Pr
h∈H
[h(x) = h(y)] ≤ 1
b
.
A straightforward consequence of this definition is the following theorem.
Theorem 2.12 Let A and B be two sets of size a and b, respectively, such that
a > b and let H be a collection of hash functions h : A→ B. If H is a universal
family of hash functions then for any set A′ ⊂ A of size N and for any x ∈ A,
the expected number of collisions between x and other elements in A′ is at most
N/b.
Notice that, in particular, if we request A to contain all strings of length ℓ
and B to have length ℓ/2, then the number of expected collisions is 2ℓ/2, hence
the probability of finding a collision is negligible in ℓ. There are several standard
ways to construct universal families of hash functions (see [CW79] for examples
and details).
3 The oblivious transfer protocol
In this section, we present a quantum protocol that achieves oblivious transfer
from Alice to Bob in polynomial time. As already mentioned in the introduc-
tion, oblivious transfer protocol is a protocol in which Alice sends (transfers) a
message m = m1m2 . . .mℓ of length ℓ to Bob (during the transfer phase), which
is recovered by him with only 50% of probability during the opening phase (the
transfer is probabilistic). The protocol must satisfy two additional properties:
be concealing, i.e., Bob must not learn m before the opening phase; and be
oblivious, i.e., after the opening phase Alice must not know with certainty if
Bob received m or not. Notice that Bob, unlike Alice, does know at the end of
the protocol if he received the intended message. In the rest of this section, we
present our results in terms of orthogonal measurementsMπ, which according to
Proposition 2.10 can be realized in polynomial time by applying Algorithm 2.9.
Protocol 3.1 (Oblivious transfer)
Message to transfer m = m1 . . .mℓ.
Security parameter n.
Universal hash function h : Σℓ → Σℓ/2.
Secret key π ∈ Kn.
Transfering phase:
Step 1. Alice generates uniformly at random the secret key π ∈
Kn.
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Step 2. Using Algorithm 2.7 with π, and the operation Csgn, she
constructs the state ρmπ = ρ
m1
π ⊗ ρm2π ⊗ . . . ⊗ ρmℓπ where
ρmiπ = ρ
+
π if mi = 1, and ρ
mi
π = ρ
−
π otherwise.
Step 3. Alice sends ρmπ and y = h(m) to Bob.
Opening phase:
Step 4. Bob generates uniformly at random τ ∈ Sn and sends it
to Alice.
Step 5. Alice computes uniformly at random either δ = π ◦ τ or
δ = τ ◦ π, and sends it back to Bob.
Step 6. Bob computes uniformly at random either γ = δ ◦ τ−1 or
γ = τ−1 ◦ δ.
Step 7. Bob measures the observable M⊗ℓγ on the system given by
Alice, obtaining the result m˜.
Step 8. Bob checks if h(m˜) = y. If so, he concludes that the
message sent by Alice is m˜, i.e., m˜ = m.
Step 9. If Bob got the correct message, he chooses another π′ ∈
Kn and measures the observable M
⊗ℓ
π′ on the system, ob-
taining result r = r1 . . . rℓ. If approximately half of the
results ri are different from the corresponding mi, then
Bob accepts the message; otherwise he aborts the protocol
declaring that Alice tried to cheat.
To show that our proposal is an oblivious transfer protocol we must prove
that:
1. If Alice is honest, then the protocol is computationally concealing, i.e.,
Bob cannot learn the message m before the opening phase. Notice that
this follows directly from the hardness assumption of computational in-
distinguishability of states ρ+ and ρ− (Theorem 2.5) and from the fact
that the hash function used for comparison has exponentially many colli-
sions, i.e., only with negligible probability Bob can correctly invert h in
probabilistic polynomial time and obtain m.
2. If both Alice and Bob are honest, i.e., they play their roles accordingly to
Protocol 3.1 to transfer message m, then roughly in 50% of the cases Bob
will obtain m (probabilistic transfer). Notice that the acknowledgment
that m˜ is correct is given by the comparison of y with h(m˜);
3. If Bob is honest, then the protocol is oblivious, i.e., Alice cannot learn with
certainty whether Bob got the message m or not. This is a consequence
of the impossibility of faster than light information transmission and it is
ensured by the last step of the protocol. The rationale for Step 9 is to
prevent Alice from cheating by sending a state that would allow her to
know with certainty that Bob would receive the message. We postpone
the discussion of this point for the end of the paper.
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Notice that if the order of compositions agree in Steps 5 and 6 of the Protocol,
i.e., Alice and Bob applied respectively τ and τ−1 on the same side, then γ = π;
otherwise, if Alice and Bob applied τ and τ−1 on different sides, then both
γ = τ−1 ◦ π ◦ τ and γ = τ ◦ π ◦ τ−1 belong to Kn but are different from π.
Also, due to the properties of hash functions, two messages having the same
hash are hard to find, in the sense that the probability of such event is negligible.
Therefore, if in Step 8 of the Protocol h(m˜) = y = h(m), then m˜ is, up to
negligible probability, the actual message m.
Therefore, if both Alice and Bob are honest, then Bob measures with equal
probability either M⊗ℓπ or M
⊗ℓ
π′ , where π
′ = τ ◦ π ◦ τ−1 ∈ Kn for some τ ∈ Sn.
If he measures M⊗ℓπ , then the measurement result m˜ will indeed be equal to m,
which he can confirm by comparing h(m˜) and y. Otherwise, and since π′ does
not match the used π, each single-system measurement will yield a random m˜i,
and by confirming that h(m˜) 6= y, Bob will know that he did not receive the
intended message.
This way, if both parties are honest, Bob will recover the message with
probability 1/2. We formalize these in the following theorem:
Theorem 3.2 (Correctness of the Protocol 3.1) Assume that QSCDff is
polynomially hard even for quantum computers. If Alice and Bob correctly run
Protocol 3.1 to transfer message m = m1 . . .mℓ from Alice to Bob, then:
1. (Concealing) Bob cannot infer m before the opening phase except with
negligible probability.
2. (Probabilistic transfer) Bob will receive m with probability 1/2+ ε(ℓ),
where ε(ℓ) is a negligible function.2
3. (Oblivious) Alice remains oblivious to the fact that Bob received the mes-
sage.
Proof: We prove each item stated in the theorem separately.
1. The concealing property follows directly form Theorem 2.5 proved in
[KKNY05], which states that distinguishing ρ+π from ρ
−
π without know-
ing π is polynomially hard even for a quantum computer. Notice that
since Alice does not send π, the probability that Bob guesses the correct
π is negligible: the size of Kn is
|Kn| = n!
(n/2)!
,
which is already for n = 10 huge enough for practical purposes. On the
other hand, since it is assumed that h is a universal hash function, trying
to recoverm by computing the inverse of h is only possible with negligible
probability. In fact, since the hash function h maps strings of length ℓ to
strings of length ℓ/2, by Theorem 2.12 one can recoverm with probability
2−ℓ/2 which is negligible in ℓ.
2A function ε(ℓ) is said to be negligible if ε(ℓ) < 1/p(ℓ) for any polynomial p(ℓ) and
sufficiently large ℓ.
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2. It is easy to see that after Step 6 of Protocol 3.1, γ = π with probability
1/2 if both Alice and Bob make their choices in Steps 5 and 6 at random,
and Bob chooses τ uniformly at random.
For γ = π, the result that the measurement M⊗ℓπ (ρ
m
π ) equals m follows
from Proposition 2.10.
It remains to show that when γ = π′ 6= π, by performing the measurement
M⊗ℓγ , the probability of recovering m from the quantum state ρ
m
π sent
by Alice is negligible. First we prove that for any σ the result of the
measurement of M ℓπ′ is random. Observe that
P±π′(
∣∣ψ+π (σ)〉) = ∑
σ′∈En
∣∣ψ±π′(σ′)〉 〈ψ±π′(σ′)|ψ+π (σ)〉
=
1
2
√
2
∑
σ′∈En
(|σ′〉 ± |σ′ ◦ π′〉)(〈σ′| ± 〈σ′ ◦ π′|)(|σ〉+ |σ ◦ π〉)
=
1
2
√
2
∑
σ′∈En
(|σ′〉 ± |σ′ ◦ π′〉)(〈σ′|σ〉+ 〈σ′|σ ◦ π〉 ± 〈σ′ ◦ π′|σ〉 ± 〈σ′ ◦ π′|σ ◦ π〉)
=


1
2
√
2
∑
σ′∈En
(|σ′〉 ± |σ′ ◦ π′〉)(〈σ′|σ〉 + 〈σ′ ◦ π′|σ ◦ π〉), if σ ∈ En
1
2
√
2
∑
σ′∈En
(|σ′〉 ± |σ′ ◦ π′〉)(〈σ′|σ ◦ π〉 ± 〈σ′ ◦ π′|σ〉), if σ ∈ n
=
1
2
√
2
(|σ〉 ± |σ ◦ π′〉+ |σ ◦ π〉 ± |σ ◦ π ◦ π′〉)
=
1
2
(
∣∣ψ±π′(σ)〉± ∣∣ψ±π′(σ ◦ π ◦ π′)〉
=
1√
2
(
1√
2
(
∣∣ψ±π′(σ)〉± ∣∣ψ±π′(σ ◦ π ◦ π′)〉)
)
.
Since
∣∣ψ±π′(σ)〉 and ∣∣ψ±π′(σ ◦ π ◦ π′)〉 are orthogonal, the vector 1√2 (∣∣ψ±π′(σ)〉±∣∣ψ±π′(σ ◦ π ◦ π′)〉) is unitary and ||P±π′(ψ+π )||2 = 1/2. Hence, the probabil-
ity of recovering ± from ρ+π is
Prob(+;M⊗ℓπ′ , ρ
+
π ) = Tr[P
+
π′ρ
+
π P
+
π′ ]
=
2
n!
∑
σ∈En
Tr[P+π′
∣∣ψ+π′(σ)〉〈ψ+π′(σ)∣∣P+π′ ]
=
2
n!
∑
σ∈En
||P+π′(ψ+π )||2
=
1
2
and similarly Prob(−;M⊗ℓπ′ , ρ+π ) = 12 . Mutatis mutandis we also have
Prob(±;M⊗ℓπ′ , ρ−π ) = 12 . Hence, by measuring M⊗ℓπ′ on ρmπ the probability
of recovering m is negligible in ℓ.
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To conclude the proof of the second item we need to show that Bob aborts
the protocol in Step 9 only with negligible probability.
Notice that to reach Step 9, where Bob aborts the protocol, he must
had run successfully the verification in Step 7. This implies that Bob
performed the measurement with the correct trapdoor π, hence the state
stayed invariant, i.e., it is still ρmπ . If Bob chooses in Step 9 random
π′ 6= π, then the probability of recovering each bit of the message, as
just seen above, is equal to 1/2 and so, by a simple binomial argument,
the probability of having a significant difference from half of the states is
negligible on ℓ.
3. Notice that Alice must send a permutation δ, such that both δ ◦ τ−1
and τ−1 ◦ δ are from Kn. Bob’s choice to compose δ with τ−1 on the
left, or on the right, is random and unknown to Alice: after sending δ
there is no more communication between Alice and Bob and there is no
information transmission from Bob to Alice. Therefore, the choice of Bob’s
measurement observable M⊗ℓγ is also unknown to Alice as well: Alice
cannot know if Bob has obtained the message m, or not. 
Finally we prove the security of the protocol against cheating strategies of
Alice and Bob.
Theorem 3.3 (Security) Assume that QSCDff is polynomially hard even for
a quantum computer. The Protocol 3.1 is secure against cheating, i.e.
1. (Concealing) If Alice is honest, then Bob cannot learn m before the
opening phase even if he cheats.
2. (Oblivious) If Bob is honest, then Alice cannot learn with certainty if
he received the message even if she tries to cheat.
Proof:
1. Notice that upon receiving a system from Alice the only thing Bob can do
in order to learn its state (and hence the message m) is to simply “look”
at it, i.e., perform a measurement in order to distinguish between ρ+π and
ρ−π (without knowing π). This is exactly what an honest Bob could do,
which was proved in Theorem 3.2 to be unfeasible.
2. To finish the argument of the security of Protocol 3.1 we show that the
protocol is unconditionally oblivious against a cheating Alice, i.e., there
is no strategy for Alice which would enable her to know with certainty
if Bob received the message m or not. This is ensured by the last step
of the protocol. Notice that since Alice cannot know beforehand which
permutation τ will be chosen by Bob, nor she knows which γ Bob choses
in Step 6 of the protocol, she does not know which measurement M⊗ℓγ ,
with γ ∈ Kn, is performed by Bob in Step 7. Therefore, in order to know
if Bob received the message m, she must prepare a state ρm that leads
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to the same answer m regardless of the measurement selected by Bob.
Obviously, in order to satisfy the requirement that Bob learns m in 50%
of the cases, she sends uniformly at random either ρm, in which case she
knows with certainty that Bob got the message, or a completely mixed
state (1/n!)⊗ℓ, in which case she knows with certainty that Bob does not
get the message except with negligible probability. So, if Alice wants to
be non-oblivious, she needs to prepare states that give with certainty the
same result for every measurement Mπ, and are thus invariant, which is
the reason for introducing Step 9. If Bob got the correct message, he
can recheck that Alice did not use this cheating strategy by performing
another measurement of the same kind but with a different π′. Since the
state sent by Alice has to be invariant for any measurement, measuring
the state with this π′ will lead to the same result as the original choice
and Bob will thus abort the protocol. 
4 Conclusions
Oblivious transfer is an important primitive for designing cryptographic proto-
cols and secure multiparty computation schemes. In this paper we proposed a
polynomial time quantum protocol for oblivious transfer of information from Al-
ice to Bob based on the QSCDff state distinguishability problem. We showed
that, assuming QSCDff to be polynomially hard even for a quantum com-
puter, our protocol is computationally concealing, oblivious, achieves the goal
of transferring information with probability close to 1/2, and is secure against
cheating strategies. The oblivious and the probabilistic transferring properties
rely on the laws of quantum mechanics, while the acknowledgment of the mes-
sage transfer is ensured by the use of hash functions. Note that, in general, one
may not need to use hash functions. For example, if the message sent by Alice is
of a particular type, say an NP -problem (e.g. SAT or some hard optimization
problem), then there is no need to encode the message in the hash value: Bob
can verify if he received the message by simply checking if it is the solution of
the problem. Also if the message sent by Alice is a binary code of some text in
a human language, then the verification of the meaningful information serves as
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